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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The criminal statutes that Mr. and Mrs. Nixon violated 
make no exception for “mature minors” or for religious belief.  
This Court could not, of course, carve an exception out of 
these statutes based simply on the kind of policy arguments 
that fill most of Appellants’ Brief, which are in any event 
deeply flawed.  To uphold the Nixons’ appeal, this Court would 
have to conclude that “mature minors” have a constitutional 
right to exemption from any and all laws of the Commonwealth 
designed to protect children.  Such a conclusion would be 
unprecedented, unwarranted, and exceedingly unwise.  In 
addition, the Court would have to conclude that in this case 
the trial court was required to make a post-mortem 
determination of Shannon Nixon’s maturity, based on the say-so 
of her parents and members of their religious community.  That 
result would be absurd. 
Under Pennsylvania law, all parents have a vital legal 
responsibility to secure necessary medical care for their 
children, regardless of the children’s expressed wishes.  Mr. 
and Mrs. Nixon chose to ignore that legal responsibility even 
after having been convicted previously for causing the death 
of another child.  This Court must ensure that this time the 
Nixons, and all other parents inclined to flout this legal 
obligation, get the message. 
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ARGUMENT 
The new rule of law Appellants ask this Court to 
legislate would be unprecedented and disastrous.  It would 
encourage parents to pressure their seriously ill children 
into saying that it is they who want to refuse medical care, 
thereby adding a tremendous psychological burden to the 
terrible suffering the children are already enduring.  The 
Pennsylvania Legislature has imposed responsibility on parents 
to ensure that their children receive medical care, and there 
the responsibility must remain.  Mr. and Mrs. Nixon should be 
ashamed for attempting to shift to their deceased daughter 
responsibility for the choices they made about how to govern 
her life. 
What were the consequences of Appellants’ refusal to 
fulfill their legal obligation as parents?  In its evaluation 
of this case, this Court may not, of course, assume that 
Shannon Nixon had spiritual interests at stake in the decision 
regarding her medical care.  For the Court to do so, it would 
have to declare the truth of certain religious beliefs, which 
it may not do. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 
593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (“The 
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government 
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious 
belief.”)  In our society, the state does not make judgments 
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about individuals’ spiritual interests, whether or how they 
will attain salvation, or whether they are right with God.  
From this Court’s perspective, then, the only consequences for 
Shannon of not receiving medical care were horrible suffering 
and death. 
 The Court must therefore answer two questions: 1) Do 
parents as a general rule have a legal obligation to prevent 
such harm to their minor children whenever possible, 
regardless of the children’s wishes and regardless of the 
children’s age?  2) Do the religious beliefs of parents or 
children diminish that obligation?  Under Pennsylvania law, 
the answer to the first question is quite clearly “yes.” Under 
the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the answer to the second 
question is just as clearly “no.” 
 
I. PENNSYLVANIA LAW IMPOSES ON PARENTS AN OBLIGATION TO 
SECURE MEDICAL CARE FOR A SERIOUSLY ILL CHILD, WITHOUT 
EXCEPTION FOR THE WISHES OF THE CHILD. 
 
A. Appellants Had A Clear Legal Obligation To Ensure 
That Their Daughter Received Medical Care. 
 
Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law imposes on 
all parents a legal obligation to provide proper care for 
their children.  It defines as child abuse -- a violation of 
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legal obligations that can trigger loss of parental authority 
and even termination of a parent-child relationship -- “the 
failure to provide the essentials of life, including adequate 
medical care, which endangers a child’s life or development or 
impairs the child’s functioning.” 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 
6303(b)(1)(iv).  There can be no question, and Appellants do 
not dispute, that the Nixons’ failure to secure medical care 
for Shannon was presumptively child abuse, and a violation of 
their legal obligations as parents. 
In addition, the laws of Pennsylvania make it a criminal 
offense for parents to cause a child to die or otherwise to 
endanger a child’s welfare by failing to secure necessary 
medical care for the child. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2504 
(involuntary manslaughter); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 (endangering 
the welfare of a child); and Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. 
Super. 10, 497 A.2d 616 (1985), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 620, 
538 A.2d 874 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Barnhart v. 
Pennsylvania, 488 U.S. 817, 109 S.Ct. 55, 102 L.Ed.2d 34 
(1988).  There can be no question, and Appellants do not 
dispute, that the Nixons’ failure to secure medical care for 
Shannon was presumptively a serious criminal offense. 
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B. The Expressed Wishes of a Minor Child Not to Receive 
Medical Care Do Not, And Should Not, Diminish 
Parents’ Legal Responsibility 
 
 Throughout its laws governing children’s lives, including 
the criminal child endangerment law and the Child Protective 
Services Law, the Pennsylvania Legislature has identified the 
terms “minor” and “child” with a person under the age of 
eighteen. See, e.g., 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4304 (child 
endangerment); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101(a),(b) (age for entering 
contracts and for suing or being sued); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5302 
(custody of children); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5501 (parental 
liability for tortious acts of children); 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 
6102(a) (abuse of family members); and 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 
6303(b)(1) (i), (ii), (iii) (child protection).  Neither the 
criminal statutes under which the Nixons were convicted nor 
the Child Protective Services Law make any mention of the 
wishes of children, whether “mature” or otherwise.  In 
imposing a legal obligation on parents to secure appropriate 
medical care for their children, the Legislature made no 
exception for parents whose children are seventeen, or 
sixteen, or fifteen, or any other age, and who express a 
preference not to receive medical care.  The Legislature 
imposed this obligation of care on parents until their 
children reach the age of eighteen, period.   
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Appellants do not contend that the Pennsylvania 
Legislature has created a “mature minor” exception to parents’ 
statutorily-imposed duties.  Rather, they contend that this 
Court must create one.  Appellants advance two arguments to 
support this contention.  First, Appellants argue that because 
some other States have a mature minor rule for some medical 
care decisions, Pennsylvania must adopt one for child abuse 
cases.  Second, they argue that minors have a constitutional 
privacy right that entails a right to refuse necessary medical 
care and that obviates parents’ legal obligations.  Both 
arguments are deeply flawed. 
 
1. Appellants’ claim that mature minors should be 
able to refuse medical care rests on illogic 
and a misunderstanding of the Court’s role. 
 
Appellants cite to adoption of a mature minor rule in 
certain medical contexts in some States, and contend that this 
Court should legislate such a rule for child abuse cases.  
Implicit in Appellants’ argument are the premises 1) that if a 
mature minor rule is a good idea in some contexts, then it 
must be a good idea in all contexts, and 2) that if something 
is a good idea, then the courts of Pennsylvania must create a 
law to implement it.  Both premises are false. 
As Appellants state repeatedly in their Brief, some 
States allow minors who demonstrate the requisite capacity and 
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knowledge of consequences “to consent to” certain forms of 
medical treatment themselves, without needing to obtain 
parental authorization. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 11, 
12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21.  The kinds of medical treatment 
some States empower mature minors to authorize are principally 
abortion, treatment for sexually transmitted disease, and 
treatment for alcohol and drug addiction.  These are forms of 
medical care those States believe can be very beneficial to 
minors, but which minors might never receive if forced to 
inform their parents of their situation and secure their 
parents’ consent.  The legislatures and/or courts of those 
States have therefore empowered minors to authorize these 
forms of treatment themselves in some cases, so that they can 
protect and promote their physical well being and preserve for 
themselves an open future, an adulthood with a wide range of 
opportunities to make a life for themselves.  The mature minor 
rule is designed to facilitate placement of minors in the care 
of medical professionals, who have a legal and professional 
obligation to promote the minors’ welfare. 
To conclude from these instances of authorizing minors to 
consent to beneficial medical care that many States think it a 
good idea to enable minors to refuse needed medical treatment 
is to elevate illogic to an art form.  The mature minor rule 
some States have adopted does not reflect a judgment that some 
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minors should be empowered to do whatever they want with their 
lives, or that some minors should be treated in every respect 
like adults.  Rather, it reflects a judgment only that 
sometimes it is necessary, in order for minors to receive the 
medical care they need, to circumvent parental authority. Cf. 
Parents United For Better Schools, Inc. v. School District Of 
Philadelphia Board of Education, 978 F.Supp. 197, 208, 209-210 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (discussing the purposes of the Minors’ 
Consent Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 10101-10105, and discussing 
the rationales underlying minors’ limited constitutional 
privacy right in connection with reproductive health care). 
Appellants cite just two instances of a State ostensibly 
allowing a mature minor to refuse medical treatment -- one 
judicial decision in the State of Illinois, In re E.G., 133 
Ill.2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322 (1989), and one 1972 judicial 
decision in Pennsylvania, In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 
387 (1972). See Brief for Appellants at 14, 22-23.1  Neither of 
those decisions should influence the Court’s reasoning, as 
explained below.  Oddly, Appellants entirely ignore in their 
                                                          
1 Appellants also discuss at length this Court’s decision in In re 
Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 673 A.2d 905 (1996), a case addressing the 
patently dissimilar situation of withdrawing life support from an 
adult in a persistent vegetative state.  See Brief for Appellant at 
24, 29-31.  Appellants rely heavily on this case despite the pains 
this Court took to emphasize that “our holding today applies only to 
situations where the individual in question was once a competent 
adult, but is now in a permanent vegetative state.” 543 Pa. at 608, 
673 A.2d at 913. 
 9 
Brief a 1992 ruling of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 
upheld by this Court, rejecting the mature minor defense in 
circumstances similar to this case. See Commonwealth v. 
Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992), appeal denied, 
535 Pa. 673, 636 A.2d 632 (1993). 
E.G., supra, the Illinois decision cited by Appellants, 
involved a minor just under the age of eighteen who had 
leukemia and who concurred with her mother in refusing blood 
transfusions, for religious reasons.  The transfusions would 
have prolonged the minor’s life, but “[t]he long-term 
prognosis [was] not optimistic, as the survival rate for 
patients such as E.G. is 20 to 25%.” 133 Ill.2d at 102, 549 
N.E.2d at 323.  The Illinois court indicated that there is no 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, for adults 
or minors.  133 Ill.2d at 108, 549 N.E.2d 326.  But a majority 
of the court discerned such a right for adults in the common 
law of the State of Illinois, and without analysis decided to 
extend that right to mature minors, simply because it could 
not see any reason not to. 133 Ill.2d at 109; 549 N.E.2d at 
326.  Certainly there are reasons not to, as discussed below, 
so either the case was poorly briefed or the court chose to 
ignore reasons proffered by the State.  In fact, the court 
seemed quite confused as to whom it was according a right, 
appearing to conflate the right of the minor with the right of 
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the parent.  The court suggested that if the parent wanted the 
minor to receive medical care, then she would have to receive 
it. 133 Ill.2d 112, 549 N.E.2d at 328.  The minor’s “right” 
thus appears not to have been much of a right at all. 
Appellants concede that Green, supra, the 1972 
Pennsylvania decision, is inapposite to the present case 
because “Green dealt only with a non-fatal situation, not 
health care decisions in life-threatening situations.” Brief 
for Appellant at 23.  In fact, in Green, the medical care 
decision was of little urgency, and on medical grounds alone 
was a toss-up.  The Supreme Court found that it could not say 
that the operation was required in order to protect the 
welfare of Ricky Green.  448 Pa. at 348, 292 A.2d at 392.  
Ricky Green had paralytic scoliosis, which caused a very 
gradual deterioration in his physical condition, curvature of 
the spine. 448 Pa. at 340, 292 A.2d at 388.  Doctors proposed 
a spinal fusion to relieve the condition somewhat, while 
cautioning Ricky and his mother that the operation would be 
“dangerous.” 448 Pa. at 341, 292 A.2d at 388.   
The Supreme Court first ruled, in a 4-3 decision, that 
Ricky’s mother had a free exercise right to refuse the blood 
transfusion, at least so long as Ricky did not disagree with 
his mother. 448 Pa. at 348-49, 292 A.2d at 392.  After a 
remand to determine whether Ricky did wish to receive the 
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operation, the Supreme Court ruled, two months shy of Ricky’s 
eighteenth birthday, that the operation need not be performed, 
since Ricky also preferred, in large part for purely medical 
reasons, not to undergo the operation. In re Green, 452 Pa. 
373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).  It is not clear, then, that the 
outcome of Green was based on any right of a mature minor to 
refuse treatment.  Rather, the Court implied that Ricky had a 
right to consent to treatment if he so desired, a right that 
would override the mother’s religious objection to 
transfusions.  And the Court simply concluded that Ricky did 
not so desire. 
In any event, the criminal provisions under which 
Appellants were convicted were not at issue in Green, and 
those criminal provisions independently impose a critical 
legal duty of care on parents, one so important as to be 
backed by criminal sanctions.  In addition, the Pennsylvania 
Legislature passed the criminal child endangerment law between 
the times of the first and second decisions of the Supreme 
Court in the Green litigation, see P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1 
(Dec. 6, 1972), and enacted the Child Protective Services Law 
long after the Green litigation, see P.L. 1240, No. 206, § 2 
(Dec. 19, 1990) (original enactment) and P.L. 1292, No. 151, § 
1 (Dec. 16, 1994) (amending law).  The Legislature, although 
undoubtedly aware of Green and cognizant that situations of 
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that sort could arise with some regularity, chose not to 
include a mature minor exception in either of these laws. 
Cottam, supra, a 1992 decision of the Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania, was like this proceeding an appeal from a 
criminal conviction of parents who, for religious reasons, 
caused a child to die from lack of necessary care.  The 
Cottams withheld food, rather than medical care, from their 
fourteen year-old son, and he died as a result.  The Cottams 
argued on appeal that they did not have a legal duty to 
provide food to their son, because he was “of sufficient 
intellect and maturity” to make decisions for himself and he 
had “voluntarily refrained from eating based on their 
religious beliefs.” 420 Pa. Super. at 333, 616 A.2d at 999.   
The Superior Court granted that a child of sufficient 
intellect and maturity “can assert her own religious identity” 
in the very limited sense of being able to decide such things 
as which of her parents’ different churches, in a post-divorce 
context, she would attend – a decision of no consequence for 
her health and well being from the state’s perspective.  420 
Pa. Super. at 334-35, 616 A.2d at 999-1000 (citing Zummo v. 
Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990)).  But the 
court stated categorically that children’s ability to assert a 
religious identity in that limited sense “has no bearing” on 
whether they should be permitted to refuse to eat, and “does 
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not dispel [parents’] duty while the children are in their 
care, custody and control to provide them with parental care, 
direction and sustenance.” 420 Pa. Super. at 335, 616 A.2d at 
1000.  The Superior Court therefore upheld the parents’ 
conviction. 
In sum, then, precedent does not support Appellants’ plea 
for a mature minor rule in contexts like the present one 
involving refusal of needed medical treatment.  Appellants 
also appeal, however, to this Court’s sense of rationality.  
They suggest that drawing a line between eighteen year-olds 
and sixteen or seventeen year-olds, in deciding when 
individuals become fully in control of their own destiny, is 
simply arbitrary. There is no significant difference, they 
assert, between a girl on the cusp of her seventeenth birthday 
and an eighteen year-old, so that if the Commonwealth allows 
eighteen year-olds to make tragic decisions, it should also 
allow sixteen and seventeen year-olds to do so as well. See, 
e.g., Brief for Appellant at 25-26, 31.  
One could argue, of course, that even an eighteen year-
old should not be empowered to refuse necessary and effective 
medical care, and that only after, say, age twenty-one should 
individuals be able to make such a fateful choice.2  Eighteen 
                                                          
2 Indeed, this Court has indicated that, as is true is some other 
States, in Pennsylvania there may in some circumstances be a legal 
duty to secure medical care for a seriously ill adult spouse even 
 14 
year-olds, especially those raised in insular subcultures, are 
typically just beginning to mature and are getting just their 
first glimpse of alternative ways of life and worldviews that 
are open to them, their first sense that they can chart their 
own future.  But the Pennsylvania Legislature has made a 
judgment that eighteen, the age at which most offspring leave 
the sheltered environment of their upbringing to explore the 
outside world, is a significant milestone in an individual’s 
life.  It marks entrance into adulthood, a status that entails 
the right to make (nearly) all the decisions about one’s own 
life, foolish or otherwise.  On the basis of that judgment, 
the Commonwealth does not permit persons under age eighteen to 
do many things adults are permitted to do, such as purchase 
tobacco or cigarettes, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6305, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 
6306; purchase or possess firearms or explosives, 18 Pa. 
C.S.A. § 6110.1, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302; have sexual relations 
with other persons, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301; pose for 
pornographic pictures, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6312; and purchase or 
consume alcohol, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308. In fact, the legal age 
for purchasing and consuming alcohol in Pennsylvania is 
twenty-one. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308. None of these restrictions 
on the freedom of minors contains a mature minor exception.  A 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
where the spouse expresses religious opposition to receiving medical 
care. See Commonwealth v. Konz, 498 Pa. 639, 644-46, 450 A.2d 638, 
641-42 (1982). 
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person under eighteen cannot even get a tattoo in Pennsylvania 
without parental consent. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6311.  Yet 
Appellants contend that minors should have the power to refuse 
life-saving medical care.3 
Finally, not only are Appellants thoroughly unconvincing 
in arguing that letting minors refuse medical care would be 
good policy, but they also fundamentally misunderstand the 
function of the courts in this situation.  Their lengthy plea 
that this Court take notice of what other States have done is 
simply inapt.  For even if statutes or court decisions in some 
States did reflect a judgment that some minors should be able 
to do whatever they want with their bodies, which they do not, 
and even if that were a sound judgment, which it would not be, 
it is, of course, not the office of this or any other court to 
create an exception to duly-enacted statutes based on a 
supposition that an exception would be a good idea.   
Likewise, even if the Legislature acted arbitrarily in 
imposing parental obligations until a child turns eighteen, 
rather than until a child turns sixteen, which it did not, it 
would not be for the courts to rewrite the Pennsylvania 
statutes to establish a different age of emancipation.  In 
                                                          
3 In support of their position that mature minors should be treated 
like adults in this context, Appellants also point out that the 
criminal justice system sometimes treats minors like adults. See, 
e.g., Brief for Appellants at 15, 18-20.  But the criminal justice 
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contrast, the courts in other States that have adopted a 
mature minor rule, for purposes of allowing minors to consent 
to treatment, were creating an exception to a common law 
doctrine -- namely, that requiring parental consent to 
treatment of minors. See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area 
Medical Center, 188 W.Va. 105, 116, 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (1992) 
(referring to “our adoption of the mature minor exception to 
the common law rule of parental consent”).  Appellants’ call 
for this Court to create a mature minor exception to the 
involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment statutes is, 
quite simply, misdirected. 
 
2. Children’s constitutional privacy right does 
not and should not include a right to refuse 
necessary and effective medical treatment. 
 
Appellants contend, secondarily, that minors have a 
constitutional right of privacy that entails a right to refuse 
necessary medical care.  They cite numerous decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and of this Court recognizing a 
constitutional right to privacy. Brief for Appellants at 26-
29.  That right, originally conceptualized as arising from the 
penumbra of several constitutional rights, has more recently 
been conceptualized as a substantive due process right. See, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
system’s treatment of minors is motivated primarily by public 
demands that have nothing to do with respecting minors’ autonomy.  
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e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 112 
S.Ct. 2791, 2807, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).  The constitutional 
protection afforded in the cases Appellants cite does 
encompass a right to substantial autonomy in matters 
concerning one’s body and one’s healthcare.   
All of the decisions Appellants cite, however, involved 
adults.  And even in the context of decision making by 
competent adults, the courts have not made the right 
unlimited.  Most recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), the United 
States Supreme Court emphasized, in holding that even 
terminally ill competent adults do not have a right to 
complete control over decisions concerning their physical well 
being, that although “many of the rights and liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy 
[this] does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and 
all important, intimate, and personal decisions are 
protected." 521 U.S. at 727, 117 S.Ct. at 2271. 
The Court in Glucksburg held that States have a 
commanding interest in preserving human life, even with 
respect to terminally ill adults. 521 U.S. at 728, 117 S.Ct. 
at 2272.  That interest is indisputably even more compelling 
with respect to minors who can lead long, healthy, and 
fulfilling lives if they receive proper medical care. Cf. 521 
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U.S. at 731-32, 117 S.Ct. at 2273 (holding that States also 
have an important interest “in protecting vulnerable groups . 
. . from abuse, neglect, and mistakes” and in “protecting the 
vulnerable from coercion”).  See also Walker v. Superior 
Court, 47 Cal.3d 112, 139, 763 P.2d 852, 870 (Cal. 1988), 
cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3186, 105 L.Ed.2d 695 
(1989) (“Imposition of felony liability for endangering or 
killing an ill child by failing to provide medical care 
furthers an interest of unparalleled significance: the 
protection of the very lives of California’s children, upon 
whose ‘healthy, well-rounded growth . . . into full maturity 
as citizens’ our ‘democratic society rests, for its 
continuance.’” (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 443, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)). 
Appellants correctly point out that children are persons, 
and that children have constitutional rights.  But it is also 
true that children’s constitutional rights are not identical 
to adults’ constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 
49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (finding that States have “broader 
authority to regulate the activities of children than of 
adults”).  And they should not be.  In some respects 
children’s rights should be greater, or simply different.  For 
example, children have rights to education and to assistance 
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from others in securing medical care, even though adults do 
not have comparable rights.  This case is very much about that 
latter right.  In other respects, such as the right to self-
determination, children’s rights must be lesser.  It would be 
absurd, for example, to say that children’s rights relating to 
sex or gun possession should be identical to those of adults.   
In our legal system, individuals enjoy a right to full-
fledged autonomy when they are presumptively competent to make 
free and informed decisions about the many aspects of their 
lives, including their healthcare.  The notion that teenage 
children in general, including those being raised in an 
insulated religious community and indoctrinated from infancy 
to oppose medical care, are fully competent and free and fully 
informed with respect to refusing critical medical treatment 
is preposterous.  The trial court did not find any of these 
things to be true of Shannon Nixon.4  And it would be absurd 
for this Court to legislate that seriously ill children 
expressing a desire not to receive medical assistance should 
go through legal proceedings to determine whether they are 
sufficiently competent, free of parental control, and informed 
that they should be empowered to sacrifice their physical well 
being, and indeed to give up their lives.   
                                                          
4 The Superior Court was therefore mistaken in characterizing Shannon 
as a mature minor; the trial court declined to make such a finding. 
See Brief for Appellant at 6, 22. 
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In any event, Shannon Nixon never had the opportunity to 
go through such a proceeding.  Mr. and Mrs. Nixon chose not to 
inform public officials of their daughter’s illness until 
after she was dead.  And, of course, as the trial court in 
this case must have realized, it would be even more absurd for 
judges to make post-mortem determinations of maturity, without 
ever laying eyes on the minor, as Appellants asked the trial 
court to do. 
It would be offensive to deny children certain rights 
simply because they are politically powerless or because they 
have historically been treated with less than the respect they 
are due as persons.  But it is entirely appropriate to deny 
children certain rights when that is necessary to ensure their 
healthy development into autonomous adults.  And what is the 
harm in doing so in this context?  Should this Court conclude 
that a sixteen year-old girl would be harmed by having her 
life preserved against her will?  On what basis could the 
Court reach that judgment?  Certainly none that does not 
entail accepting the parents’ religious beliefs, or what the 
parents claim were Shannon’s religious beliefs, as true, which 
this Court may not do. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 
U.S. 573, 593-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 
(1989). 
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On the other hand, conferring this right on minors would 
have tremendous costs – more suffering, more life-long 
impairments, and more loss of young lives.  And presumably the 
right would be operative to the same degree in cases where 
parents wanted their child to receive medical care.  A minor 
would be no less mature simply because she disagrees with her 
parents; in fact, disagreement might signal greater 
independence.  And there are many reasons why a teenager might 
decide she does not want to undergo a medical procedure, 
including reasons having nothing to do with the efficacy of 
the procedure, and courts would be hard-pressed to say that 
those reasons are less rational than religious belief.   
Moreover, if a minor is entitled to decide that she will 
not receive necessary medical care, would she not also be 
entitled to make the less fateful decisions to smoke, consume 
alcohol, and pose for pornographic pictures?  Appellants’ 
position leads ineluctably to that result.  “The mere novelty 
of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that `substantive 
due process’ sustains it.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303, 
113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). 
 
 22 
II. THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF APPELLANTS, AND THE ALLEGED 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF THEIR DAUGHTER, IN NO WAY DIMINISHED 
APPELLANTS’ LEGAL OBLIGATION AS PARENTS OR THEIR CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO FULFILL THAT OBLIGATION. 
 
Appellants do not explicitly advance a claim of religious 
freedom, for themselves or for their deceased daughter. Yet 
they repeatedly emphasize that their objection to medical 
care, and the alleged objection of Shannon Nixon to medical 
care, were based upon religious beliefs.  At one point they do 
go so far as to assert that Shannon’s “conscious choice” was 
“founded upon her constitutional right to exercise her 
religion.” Brief for Appellants at 31.  They undoubtedly hope 
that this Court will be influenced by the religious dimension 
of their case, even though they have asserted no legal claim 
on that basis.  Lest there be any uncertainty, such a claim 
would be unsupportable.  Neither the religious beliefs of 
Appellants nor the alleged religious beliefs of their daughter 
in any way diminished the legal obligation Appellants had to 
secure medical care for Shannon. 
 
A. Appellants’ Religious Beliefs Did Not Lessen Their 
Legal Obligation. 
 
The criminal statutes under which the Nixons were 
convicted contain no mention of spiritual treatment or 
religious beliefs.  The Pennsylvania Legislature has not 
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created an exemption from criminal liability for involuntary 
manslaughter or child endangerment for parents whose religious 
beliefs conflict with their legal duties.  Nor could it do so 
consistent with the United States Constitution.  Application 
of these laws in the context of child rearing is an important 
legal protection for children, and to deny that protection to 
certain children, simply to accommodate the religious 
preferences of parents, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
right of those children to equal protection of the law. See 
State v. Miskimens, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 43, 46-47, 490 N.E.2d 931, 
935-36 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1984)(invalidating on equal 
protection grounds a religious exemption to Ohio’s medical 
neglect law); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979) 
(striking down on equal protection grounds a religious 
exemption to a state law requiring vaccination of all school 
children); Dwyer, “The Children We Abandon: Religious 
Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of 
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors,” 74 N.C. 
L.Rev. 1321 (1996).   
In addition, this Court has upheld a decision of the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania decreeing that the Free 
Exercise Clause in no way compels the state to create any 
exemption from, or to diminish liability under, its 
involuntary manslaughter or child endangerment statutes for 
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parents who oppose medical care for their children on 
religious grounds. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa.Super. 10, 
22-26, 497 A.2d 616, 623-26 (Pa. 1985), appeal denied, 517 Pa. 
620, 538 A.2d 874. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
230, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (emphasizing, 
in holding that Amish parents were entitled to an exemption 
from State compulsory school attendance laws, that the Court 
believed this would not result in any harm to the children); 
Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F.Supp. 488 
(W.D. Wash. 1967), affirmed per curiam, 390 U.S. 598, 88 S.Ct. 
1260, 20 L.Ed.2d 158 (1968)(ordering blood transfusions for 
child over religious objection of Jehovah’s Witness parents); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 444, 
88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (“Parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves.  But it does not follow they are free . . . to 
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the 
age of full and legal discretion when they can make that 
choice for themselves.”).  Though Appellants do not cite 
Barnhart in their Brief, it may explain why they do not claim 
that they had any right, as a matter of religious freedom, to 
do what they did.  
Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law does contain 
a special provision for situations of this kind, but that 
provision in no way exempts any parents from the legal 
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obligation to take steps leading to medical care for a sick 
child.  23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6303 provides:  
If, upon investigation, the county agency determines 
that a child has not been provided needed medical 
care or surgical care because of seriously held 
religious beliefs of the child’s parents, guardian 
or person responsible for the child’s welfare, which 
beliefs are consistent with those of a bona fide 
religion, the child shall not be deemed to be 
physically or mentally abused.  The county agency 
shall closely monitor the child and shall seek 
court-ordered medical intervention when the lack of 
medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life 
or long-term health.  In cases involving religious 
circumstances, all correspondence with a subject of 
the report and the records of the Department of 
Public Welfare and the county agency shall not 
reference “child abuse” and shall acknowledge the 
religious basis for the child’s condition, and the 
family shall be referred for general protective 
services, if appropriate. (emphasis added) 
 
The clear purpose of this statutory provision is to 
ensure that children in these situations do receive medical 
care, despite the religious views of their parents, while at 
the same time accommodating parents just to the extent of 
relieving them of the need to sign medical authorization 
forms.  The provision begins by stating that parents will not 
be deemed abusive if the county agency investigates and makes 
a certain determination.  This presupposes that the county 
agency has been made aware of the child’s illness, and in 
sufficient time for it to “closely monitor the child and . . . 
seek court-ordered medical intervention when the lack of 
medical or surgical care threatens the child’s life or long-
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term health.”  A county agency can secure a judicial order of 
treatment in any case “where harm to the physical or mental 
health of the child [from non-treatment] is demonstrated.” In 
re Cabrera, 381 Pa.Super. 100, 108, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118 
(1989). 
Thus, parents whose religious beliefs preclude them from 
authorizing medical care are not abusive under the Child 
Protective Services Law if, and only if, they timely report 
the child’s illness to the county, so that the county can 
investigate and take the statutorily mandated actions.  In 
other words, parents who are religiously opposed to medical 
care have a legal duty either to bring their sick child to a 
doctor themselves or to ensure that the county agency is 
promptly informed of the child’s illness. The Nixons did 
neither.  As a result, the county agency was never able to 
investigate and take the statutorily mandated actions, and 
this provision is therefore inapplicable. 
In sum, the religious beliefs of Appellants themselves 
are entirely irrelevant to this case.  This Court must look 
upon them just as it would parents who failed to secure 
medical care for their dying daughter because they were simply 
uncaring.  The fact that they had certain religious beliefs 
did not in any way diminish their legal responsibility. 
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B. A Minor’s Religious Beliefs Do Not Affect Parents’ 
Legal Obligation to Secure Necessary Medical Care. 
 
As noted above, the criminal statutes under which 
Appellants were convicted make no mention of children’s wishes 
nor of anyone’s religious beliefs, and the Child Protective 
Services Law also says nothing about children’s wishes, 
whether religiously based or otherwise.  One can reasonably 
infer from this silence a legislative judgment not to create 
an exception to these critical child protective provisions for 
cases where children express agreement with their parents’ 
religious beliefs.  Therefore, to attribute significance to 
the fact that Shannon Nixon’s alleged desire not to receive 
medical treatment was based upon religious belief, rather than 
upon some other kind of belief or motive, Appellants would 
have to argue that minors have a First Amendment right to a 
religious exemption from the general rule that they must 
receive medical care when they are seriously ill. 
Such an argument would fail.  Even adults do not have a 
First Amendment right to a religious exemption from generally 
applicable laws mandating that they receive certain forms of 
healthcare. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (holding that generally 
applicable laws that are formally neutral as to religion are 
not subject to Free Exercise Clause challenge even if they 
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disparately impact persons with particular religious beliefs); 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 
643 (1905) (rejecting an adult’s Free Exercise Clause 
objection to mandatory vaccination). So even if minors’ 
espousal of religious beliefs should receive the same weight 
as the religious convictions of adults, a view no court or 
legislature in this country has adopted, the Free Exercise 
Clause would not confer on them a right to refuse medical care 
that State law otherwise requires them to receive.  If the 
Free Exercise Clause does not require States to create a 
religious exemption to laws, such as the law prohibiting use 
of peyote at issue in Smith, supra, that are designed in part 
to prevent adults from harming themselves, then it surely does 
not require States to create religious exemptions from laws 
designed to prevent children from harming themselves. 
Recognizing a free exercise right of minors to refuse 
critical medical care would have unacceptable consequences.  
It would encourage parents with religious objections to 
medical care to apply heavy pressure on their sick or injured 
children to express agreement with the parents’ beliefs.  
Parents would have an enormous incentive to do whatever it 
takes to make their children insist to public authorities that 
it is really they, the children, who want to refuse treatment 
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for their disease or injury -- namely, avoiding a substantial 
jail sentence.   
And what good would come of such a rule?  Teenagers would 
be able to effectuate life-threatening choices based on 
inherited beliefs.  Is that such a great good that it should 
override the good of protecting their basic welfare until they 
arrive at adulthood, when they will be free to make their own 
way in life?  Courts throughout the country have on many 
occasions ordered medical care for minors over the objection 
of parents and over objections of the minors as well.  It 
seems highly unlikely that when those minors reach adulthood 
they wish that they had suffered permanent impairment, or that 
they had died, rather than receiving medical treatment 
contrary to the religious beliefs they held at the time. 
In any event, as noted above, Appellants have advanced no 
claim based on religious freedom, for themselves or for their 
daughter.  Therefore, this Court must look upon Shannon Nixon 
just as it would upon a sixteen year-old whose parents allege 
that she decided for some other non-medical reason (e.g., she 
realized she could never have the career of her dreams) not to 
receive medical treatment for a serious illness.  The Court’s 





One purpose of criminal sentencing is to impress upon 
persons convicted of crimes the wrongfulness and harmfulness 
of their actions, so they will take responsibility for what 
they have done and commit themselves to altering their conduct 
in the future.  The line of argument Appellants have taken in 
this appeal of their convictions makes clear that they have 
not accepted responsibility for their choices and actions.  
That Shannon was the second child the Nixons caused to die 
unnecessarily makes this even clearer.  By rejecting their 
appeal in no uncertain terms, this Court can send the message 
to Appellants that they cannot with impunity flout the laws of 
the Commonwealth and their legal responsibilities as parents. 
Therefore, amici curiae Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal 
Duty, Inc.; the American Humane Association, Children’s 
Division; the National Association of Counsel for Children; 
and the National Exchange Club Foundation respectfully ask 
that this Court uphold the decision of the Superior Court. 
     Respectfully submitted: 
 
     _______________________ 
     James G. Dwyer, Esq. 
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